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Abstract
It has recently been shown (PODC 2019) that, contrarily to a common belief, money transfer in
the presence of faulty (Byzantine) processes does not require strong agreement such as consensus.
This article goes one step further: namely, it shows that money transfers do not need to explicitly
capture the causality relation that links individual transfers. A simple FIFO order between each
pair of processes is sufficient. To this end, the article presents a generic money transfer algorithm
that can be instantiated in both the crash failure model and the Byzantine failure model. The
genericity dimension lies in the underlying reliable broadcast abstraction which must be suited
to the appropriate failure model. Interestingly, whatever the failure model, the money transfer
algorithm only requires adding a single sequence number to its messages as control information.
Moreover, as a side effect of the proposed algorithm, it follows that money transfer is a weaker
problem that the construction of a read/write register in the asynchronous message-passing crash-
prone model.
2012 ACM Subject Classification Theory of computation → Distributed algorithms; Software and
its engineering → Abstraction, modeling and modularity
Keywords and phrases Asynchronous message-passing system, Byzantine process, Distributed com-
puting, Efficiency, Fault tolerance, FIFO message order, Modularity, Money transfer, Process crash,
Reliable broadcast, Simplicity.
1 Introduction
Short historical perspective
Like field-area or interest-rate computations, money transfers have had a long history (see
e.g., [18, 23]). Roughly speaking, when looking at money transfer in today’s digital era, the
issue consists in building a software object, that associates an account with each user and
provides two operations, one that allows a process to transfer money from one account to
another and one that allows a process to read the current value of an account. The main
issue of money transfer lies is the fact that the transfer of an amount of money v by a user
to another user is conditioned to the current value of its account being at least v.
Fully decentralized electronic money transfer was introduced in [21] with the Bitcoin
cryptocurrency in which there is no central authority that controls the money exchanges
issued by users. From a software point of view, Bitcoin adopts a peer-to-peer approach, while
ar
X
iv
:2
00
6.
12
27
6v
1 
 [c
s.D
C]
  1
8 J
un
 20
20
2 Money Transfer Made Simple
from an application point of view it seems to have been motivated by the 2008 subprime
crisis [27].
To attain its goal Bitcoin introduced a specific underlying distributed software techno-
logy called blockchain, which can be seen as a specific distributed state-machine-replication
technique, the aim of which is to provide its users with an object known as a concurrent
ledger. Such an object is defined by two operations, one that appends a new item in such
a way that, once added, no item can be removed, and a second operation that atomically
reads the full list of items currently appended. Hence, a ledger builds a total order on the
invocations of its operations. When looking at the synchronization power provided by a
ledger in the presence of failures, measured with the consensus-number lens, it has been
shown that the synchronization power of a ledger is +∞ [12, 25]. In a very interesting
way, recent work [13] has shown that, in a context where each user is associated with a
single device (called process in the following) and assuming each account has a single owner
which can spend its money, the consensus number of the money-transfer concurrent object
is 1. This is an important result, as it shows that the power of blockchain technology is
much stronger (and consequently more costly) than necessary to implement money transfer.
To illustrate this discrepancy, the authors of [13] show first that, in a failure-prone shared-
memory system, money transfer can be implemented on top of a snapshot object [1] (whose
consensus number is 1, and consequently can be implemented on top of read/write atomic
registers). Then, they appropriately modify their shared-memory algorithm to obtain an
algorithm that works in asynchronous failure-prone message-passing systems. To allow the
processes to correctly validate the money transfers, the resulting algorithm demands them
to capture the causality relation linking money transfers and requires each message to carry
control information encoding the causal past of the money transfer it carries.
As already indicated, the main problem encountered with money transfer is double spend-
ing (i.e., the use of the same money more than once). This problem occurs in the presence of
dishonest, i.e., Byzantine, processes. Another important issue of money transfer resides in
the privacy associated with money accounts. This means that a full solution to money trans-
fer must address two orthogonal issues: synchronization (to guarantee the consistency of the
money accounts) and confidentiality/security (usually solved with cryptography techniques).
Here, as in [13], we focus on synchronization.
Content of the article
As previously discussed, and contrarily to a common belief, the result of [13] shows that
agreement (such as consensus) is far from being necessary to implement money transfer. The
present article goes even further. It shows that, contrarily to what is currently accepted,
the implementation of a money transfer object does not require the explicit capture of the
causality relation linking individual money transfers.
To this end, we present a surprisingly simple yet efficient and generic money-transfer
algorithm that relies on an underlying reliable-broadcast abstraction. It is efficient as it
only requires a very small amount of meta-data on its messages: in addition to money-
transfer data, the only control information carried by the messages of our algorithm is
reduced to a single sequence number. It is generic in the sense that it can accommodate
different failure models with no modification. More precisely, our algorithm inherits the fault-
tolerance properties of its underlying reliable broadcast: it tolerates crashes if used with a
crash-tolerant reliable broadcast, and Byzantine faults if used with a Byzantine-tolerant
reliable broadcast.
Given an n-process system where at most t processes can be faulty, the proposed al-
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gorithm works for t < n in the crash failure model, and t < n/3 in the Byzantine failure
model. This has an interesting side effect on the distributed computability side. Namely, in
the crash failure model, money transfer constitutes a weaker problem than the construction
of a read/write register (where “weaker” means that—unlike a read/write register—it does
not require the “majority of non-faulty processes” assumption).
Roadmap
The article consists of 7 sections. First, Section 2 introduces the distributed failure-prone
computing models in which we are interested, and Section 3 provides a definition of money
transfer suited to these computing models. Then, Section 4 presents a very simple generic
money-transfer algorithm. Its instantiations and the associated proofs are presented in
Section 5 for the crash failure model and in Section 6 for the Byzantine failure model
Finally, Section 7 concludes the article.
2 Distributed Computing Models
2.1 Process failure model
Process model
The system comprises a set of n sequential asynchronous processes, denoted p1, ..., pn1.
Sequential means that a process invokes one operation at a time, and asynchronous means
that each process proceeds at its own speed, which can vary arbitrarily and always remains
unknown to the other processes.
Two process failure models are considered. The model parameter t denotes an upper
bound on the number of processes that can be faulty in the considered model. Given an
execution r (run) a process that commits failures in r is said to be faulty in r, otherwise it
is non-faulty (or correct) in r.
Crash failure model
In this model processes may crash. A crash is a premature definitive halt. This means
that, in the crash failure model, a process behaves correctly (i.e., executes its algorithm)
until it possibly crashes. This model is denoted CAMPn,t [∅] (Crash Asynchronous Message
Passing). When t is restricted not to bypass a bound f(n), the corresponding restricted
failure model is denoted CAMPn,t [t ≤ f(n)].
Byzantine failure model
In this model, processes can commit Byzantine failures [19, 24], and those that do so are said
to be Byzantine. A Byzantine failure occurs when a process does not follow its algorithm.
Hence a Byzantine process can stop prematurely, send erroneous messages, send different
messages to distinct processes when it is assumed to send the same message, etc. Let us also
observe that, while a Byzantine process can invoke an operation which generates application
messages2 it can also “simulate” this operation by sending fake implementation messages
1 Hence the system we consider is static (according to the distributed computing community parlance)
or permissioned (according to the blockchain community parlance).
2 An application message is a message sent at the application level, while an implementation is low level
message used to ensure the correct delivery of an application message.
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that give their receivers the illusion that they have been generated by a correct sender.
However, we assume that there is no Sybil attack like most previous work on byzantine fault
tolerance including [13].3
As previously, the notations BAMPn,t [∅] and BAMPn,t [t ≤ f(n)] (Byzantine Asynchron-
ous Message Passing) are used to refer to the corresponding Byzantine failure models.
2.2 Underlying complete point-to-point network
The processes communicate through an underlying message-passing point-to-point network
in which there exists a bidirectional channel between any pair of processes. Hence, when
a process receives a message, it knows which process sent this message. For simplicity, in
writing the algorithms, we assume that a process can send messages to itself.
Each channel is reliable and asynchronous. Reliable means that a channel does not lose,
duplicate, or corrupt messages. Asynchronous means that the transit delay of each message
is finite but arbitrary. Moreover, in the case of the Byzantine failure model, a Byzantine
process can read the content of the messages exchanged through the channels, but cannot
modify their content.
To make our algorithm as generic and simple as possible, Section 4 does not present it
in terms of low-level send/receive operations4 but in terms of a high-level communication
abstraction, called reliable broadcast (e.g., [7, 9, 14, 16, 25]). The definition of this commu-
nication abstraction appears in Section 5 for the crash failure model and Section 6 for the
Byzantine failure model. It is important to note that the previously cited reliable broadcast
algorithms do not use sequence numbers. They only use different types of implementation
messages which can be encoded with two bits.
3 Money Transfer: a Formal Definition
Money transfer: operations
From an abstract point of view, a money-transfer object can be seen as an abstract array
ACCOUNT [1..n] where ACCOUNT [i] represents the current value of pi’s account. This
object provides the processes with two operations denoted balance() and transfer(), whose
semantics are defined below. The transfer by a process of the amount of money v to a
process pj is represented by the pair 〈j, v〉. Without loss of generality, we assume that a
process does not transfer money to itself. It is assumed that each ACCOUNT [i] is initialized
to a non-negative value denoted init[i] (5).
Informally, when pi invokes balance(j) it obtains a value (as defined below) ofACCOUNT [j],
and when it invokes the transfer 〈j, v〉, the amount of money v is moved from ACCOUNT [i]
to ACCOUNT [j].
Histories
The following notations and definitions are inspired from [2].
3 As an example, a Byzantine process can neither spawn new identities, nor assume the identity of
existing processes.
4 Actually the send and receive operations can be seen as “machine-level” instructions provided by the
network.
5 It is possible to initialize some accounts to negative values. In this case, pos being the sum of all the
positive initial values and neg the sum of all the negative initial values, we have to assume pos > neg.
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A local execution history (or local history) of a process pi, denoted Li, is a sequence of
operations balance() and transfer() issued by pi. If an operation op1 precedes an operation
op2 in Li, we say that “op1 precedes op2 in process order”, which is denoted op1→i op2.
An execution history (or history) H is a set of n local histories, one per process, H =
(L1, · · · , Ln).
A serialization S of a history H is a sequence that contains all the operations of H and
respects the process order →i of each process pi.
Given a history H and a process pi, let Ai,T (H) denote the history (L′1, ..., L′n) such that
L′i = Li, and
For any j 6= i: L′j contains only the transfer operations of pj .
Notations
An operation transfer(j, v) invoked by pi is denoted trfi(j, v).
An invocation of balance(j) that returns the value v is denoted blc(j)/v.
Let H be a set of operations.
plus(j,H) = Σtrfk(j,v)∈H v (total of the money given to pj in H).
minus(j,H) = Σtrfj(k,v)∈H v (total of the money given by pj in H).
acc(j,H) = init[j]+plus(j,H)−minus(j,H) (value of ACCOUNT [j] according to H).
Given a historyH and a process pi, let Si be a serialization of Ai,T (H) (hence, Si respects
the n process orders defined by H). Let →Si denote the total order defined by Si.
Money-transfer-compliant serialization
A serialization Si of Ai,T (H) is money-transfer compliant (MT-compliant) if:
For any operation trfj(k, v) ∈ Si, we have v ≤ acc(j, {op ∈ Si | op→Si trfj(k, v)}), and
For any operation blc(j)/v ∈ Si, we have v = acc(j, {op ∈ Si | op→Si blc(j)/v}).
MT-compliance is the key concept at the basis of the definition of a money-transfer object.
It states that it is possible to associate each process pi with a total order Si in which (a)
each of its invocations of balance(j) returns it the value v equal to pj ’s account’s current
value according to Si, and (b) processes transfer only money that they have.
Let us observe that the common point among the serializations S1, ..., Sn lies in the fact
that each process sees all the transfer operations of any other process pj in the order they
have been produced (as defined by Lj), and sees its own transfer and balance operations in
the order it produced them (as defined by Li).
Money transfer in CAMPn,t [∅]
Considering the CAMPn,t [∅] model, a money-transfer object is an object that provides the
processes with balance() and transfer() operations and is such that, for each of its executions,
represented by the corresponding history H, we have:
All the operations invoked by correct processes terminate.
For any correct process pi, there is an MT-compliant serialization Si of Ai,T (H), and
For any faulty process pi, there is a history H ′ = (L′1, ..., L′n) where (a) L′j is a prefix
of Lj for any j 6= i, and (b) L′i = Li, and there is an MT-compliant serialization of
Ai,T (H ′).
An algorithm implementing a money transfer object is correct in CAMPn,t [∅] and produces
only executions as defined above. We then say that the algorithm is MT-compliant.
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Money transfer in BAMPn,t [∅]
The main differences between money transfer in CAMPn,t [∅] and BAMPn,t [∅] lies in the fact
a faulty process can try to transfer money it does not have, and try to present different
behaviors with respect to different correct processes. This means that, while the notion of
a local history Li is still meaningful for a non-Byzantine process, it is not for a Byzantine
process. For a Byzantine process, we therefore define a mock local history for a process
pi as any sequence of transfer operations from pi’s account6. In this definition, the mock
local history Li associated with a Byzantine process pi is not necessarily the local history
it produced, it is only a history that it could have produced from the point of view of
the correct processes. The correct processes implement a money-transfer object if they all
behave in a manner consistent with the same set of mock local histories for the Byzantine
processes. More precisely, we define a mock history associated with an execution on a money
transfer object in BAMPn,t [∅] as H˜ = (L˜1, ..., L˜n) where:
L˜j =
{
Lj if pj is correct,
a mock local history if pj is Byzantine.
Considering the BAMPn,t [∅] model, a money transfer object is such that, for each of its
executions, there exists a mock history H˜ such that for any correct process pi, there is an
MT-compliant serialization Si of Ai,T (H˜). An algorithm implementing such executions is
said to be MT-compliant.
4 A Simple Generic Money Transfer Algorithm
This section presents a generic algorithm implementing a money transfer object. As already
said, its generic dimension lies in the underlying reliable broadcast abstraction used to
disseminate money transfers to the processes, which depends on the failure model.
4.1 Reliable broadcast
Reliable broadcast provides two operations denoted r_broadcast() and r_deliver(). Because
a process is assumed to invoke the reliable broadcast each time it issues a money transfer,
we use a multi-shot reliable broadcast, that relies on explicit sequence numbers to distinguish
between its different instances (more on this below). Following the parlance of [14] we use the
following terminology: when a process invokes r_broadcast(sn,m), we say it “r-broadcasts
the message m with sequence number sn”, and when its invocation of r_deliver() returns
it a pair (sn,m), we say it “r-delivers m with sequence number sn”. While definitions of
reliable broadcast suited to the crash failure model and the Byzantine failure model will be
given in Section 5 and Section 6, respectively, we state their common properties below.
Validity. This property states that there is no message creation. To this end, it relates
the outputs (r-deliveries) to the inputs (r-broadcasts). Excluding malicious behaviors, a
message that is r-delivered has been r-broadcast.
Integrity. This property states that there is no message duplication.
Termination-1. This property states that correct processes r-deliver what they broadcast.
6 Let us remind that the operations balance() issued by a Byzantine can return any value. So they are
not considered in the mock histories associated with Byzantine processes.
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Termination-2. This property relates the sets of messages r-delivered by different pro-
cesses.
The Termination properties ensure that all the correct processes r-deliver the same set of
messages, and that this set includes at least all the messages that they r-broadcast.
As mentioned above, sequence numbers are used to identify different instances of the
reliable broadcast. Instead of using an underlying FIFO-reliable broadcast in which se-
quence numbers would be hidden, we expose them in the input/output parameters of the
r_broadcast() and r_deliver() operations, and handle their updates explicitly in our generic
algorithm. This reification7 allows us to capture explicitly the complete control related to
message r-deliveries required by our algorithm. As we will see, it follows that the instanti-
ations of the previous Integrity property (crash and Byzantine models) will explicitly refer
to “upper layer” sequence numbers.
We insist on the fact that the reliable broadcast abstraction that the proposed algorithm
depends on does not itself provide the FIFO ordering guarantee. It only uses sequence
numbers to identify the different messages sent by a process. As explained in the next section,
the proposed generic algorithm implements itself the required FIFO ordering property.
4.2 Generic money transfer algorithm: local data structures
As said in the previous section, init[1..n] is an array of constants, known by all the processes,
such that init[k] is the initial value of pk’s account, and a transfer of the quantity v from
a process pi to a process pk is represented by the pair 〈k, v〉. Each process pi manages the
following local variables:
sni: integer variable, initialized to 0, used to generate the sequence numbers associ-
ated with the transfers issued by pi (it is important to notice that the point-to-point
FIFO order realized with the sequence numbers is the only “causality-related” control
information used in the algorithm).
deli[1..n]: array initialized to [0, · · · , 0] such that deli[j] is the sequence number of the
last transfer issued by pj and locally processed by pi.
accounti[1..n]: array, initialized to init[1..n], that is a local approximate representation
of the abstract array ACCOUNT [1..n], i.e., accounti[j] is the value of pj ’s account, as
know by pi.
While other local variables containing bookkeeping information can be added according
to the application’s needs, it is important to insist on the fact that the proposed algorithm
needs only the three previous local variables (i.e., (2n + 1) local registers) to solve the
synchronization issues that arise in fault-tolerant money transfer.
4.3 Generic money transfer algorithm: behavior of a process pi
Algorithm 1 describes the behavior of a process pi. When it invokes balancei(j), pi returns
the current value of accounti[j] (line 1).
When it invokes transfer(j, v), pi first checks if it has enough money in its account (line 2)
and returns abort if it does not (line 5). If it has enough money, pi computes the next
7 Reification is the process by which an implicit, hidden or internal information is explicitly exposed to
a programmer.
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init: accounti[1..n]← init[1..n]; sni ← 0; deli[1..n]← [0, · · · , 0].
operation balance(j) is
(1) return(account[j]).
operation transfer(j, v) is
(2) if (v ≤ accounti[i])
(3) then sni ← sni + 1; r_broadcast(sni, transfer〈j, v〉);
(4) wait (deli[i] = sni); return(commit)
(5) else return(abort)
(6) end if.
when (sn,transfer〈k, v〉) is r_delivered do
(7) wait
(
(sn = deli[j] + 1) ∧ (accounti[j] ≥ v)
)
;
(8) accounti[j]← accounti[j]− v; accounti[k]← accounti[k] + v;
(9) deli[j]← sn.
1 Generic broadcast-based money transfer algorithm (code for pi)
sequence number sni and r-broadcasts the pair (sni, transfer〈j, v〉) (line 3). Then pi
waits until it has locally processed this transfer (lines 7-9), and finally returns commit. Let
us notice that the predicate at line 7 is always satisfied when pi r-delivers a transfer message
it has r-broadcast.
When pi r-delivers a pair (sn, transfer〈k, v〉) from a process pj , it does not process
it immediately. Instead, pi waits until (i) this is the next message it has to process from
pj (to implement FIFO order) and (ii) its local view of the money transfers to and from pj
(namely the current value of accounti[j]) allows this money transfer to occur (line 7). When
this happens, pi locally registers the transfer by moving the quantity v from accounti[j] to
accounti[k] (line 8) and increases deli[j] (line 9).
5 Instantiation and Proof in the Crash Failure Model
This section presents first the crash-tolerant reliable broadcast abstraction whose operations
instantiate the r_broadcast() and r_deliver() operations used in the generic algorithm. Then,
using the MT-compliance notion, it proves that Algorithm 1 combined with a crash-tolerant
reliable broadcast implements a money transfer object in CAMPn,t [∅]. It also shows that, in
this model, money transfer is weaker than the construction of an atomic read/write register.
Finally, it presents a simple weakening of the FIFO requirement that works in the model
CAMPn,t [∅].
5.1 Multi-shot reliable broadcast abstraction in the crash failure model
This communication abstraction, named CR-Broadcast, is defined by the two operations
cr_broadcast() and cr_deliver(). Hence, we use the terminology “to cr-broadcast a message”,
and “to cr-deliver a message”.
CRB-Validity. If a process pi cr-delivers a message with sequence number sn from a
process pj , then pj cr-broadcast it with sequence number sn.
CRB-Integrity. For each sequence number sn and sender pj a process pi cr-delivers at
most one message with sequence number sn from pj .
CRB-Termination-1. If a correct process cr-broadcasts a message, it cr-delivers it.
CRB-Termination-2. If a process cr-delivers a message from a (correct or faulty) process
pj , then all correct processes cr-deliver it.
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CRB-Termination-1 and CRB-Termination-2 capture the “strong” reliability property of CR-
Broadcast, namely: all the correct processes cr-deliver the same set S of messages, and this
set includes at least the messages they cr-broadcast. Moreover, a faulty process cr-delivers
a subset of S. Algorithms implementing the CR-Broadcast abstraction in CAMPn,t [∅] are
described in [14, 25].
5.2 Proof of Algorithm 1 in CAMPn,t [∅]
I Lemma 1. Any invocation of balance() or transfer() issued by a correct process terminates.
Proof. The fact that any invocation of balance() terminates follows immediately from the
code of the operation.
When a process pi invokes transfer(j, v), it r-broadcasts a message and the local predicate
(sn = deli[i] + 1) ∧ (v ≤ accounti[i]) is satisfied. Due to the CRB-Termination properties,
pi receives its own transfer message and the predicate (line 7) is necessarily satisfied. This
is because (i) only pi can transfer its own money, a (ii) the wait statement of line 4 ensures
the current invocation of transfer(j, v) does not return until the corresponding transfer
message is processed at lines 8-9, and (iii) the fact that accounti[i] cannot decrease between
the execution of line 3 and the one of line 7. It follows that pi terminates its invocation of
transfer(j, v). J
The safety proof is more involved. It consists in showing that any execution satisfies MT-
compliance as defined in Section 3.
Notation and definition
Let trfsnj (k, v) denote the operation trf(k, v) issued by pj with sequence number sn.
We say a process pi processes the transfer trfsnj (k, v) if, after it cr-delivered the associated
message transfer〈k, v〉 with sequence number sn, pj exits the wait statement at line 7
and executes the associated statements at lines 8-9. The moment at which these lines
are executed is referred to as the moment when the transfer is processed by pi. (These
notions are related to the progress of processes.)
If the message transfer cr-broadcast by a process is cr-delivered by a correct process,
we say that the transfer is successful. (Let us notice that a message cr-broadcast by a
correct process is always successful.)
I Lemma 2. If a process pi processes trfsn` (k, v), then any correct process processes trfsn` (k, v).
Proof. Let m1, m2, ... be the sequence of transfers processed by pi and let pj be a cor-
rect process. We show by induction on z that, for all z, pj processes all the messages
m1, m2, ...,mz.
Base case z = 0. As the sequence of transfers is empty, the proposition is trivially
satisfied.
Induction. Taking z ≥ 0, suppose pj processed all the transfers m1, m2, ...,mz. We have
to show that pj processes mz+1. Note that m1, m2, ...,mz do not typically originate from
the same sender, and are therefore normally processed by pj in a different order than pi,
possibly mixed with other messages. This also applies to mz+1. If mz+1 was processed by pj
before mz, we are done. Otherwise there is a time τ at which pj processed all the transfers
m1, m2, ...,mz (case assumption), cr-delivered mz+1 (CBR-Termination-2 property), but
has not yet processed mz+1. Let mz+1 = trfsn` (k, v). At time τ , we have the following.
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On one side, delj [`] ≤ sn − 1 since messages are processed in FIFO order and mz+1 has
not yet been processed. On the other side, delj [`] ≥ sn − 1 because either sn = 1 or
trfsn−1` (−,−) ∈ m1, ...,mz, where trfsn−1` (−,−) is the transfer issued by p` just before
mz+1 = trfsn` (k, v) (otherwise pi would not have processed mz+1 just after m1, ...,mz).
Thus delj [`] = sn − 1.
Let us now shown that, at time τ , accountj [`] ≥ v. To this end let plusz+1i (`) denote the
money transferred to p` as seen by pi just before pi processes mz+1, and minusz+1i (`) de-
note the money transferred from p` as seen by pi just before pi processes mz+1. Similarly,
let plusz+1j (`) denote the money transferred to p` as seen by pj at time τ and minusz+1j (`)
denote the money transferred from p` as seen by pj at time τ . Let us consider the
following sums:
On the side of the money transferred to p` as seen by pj . Due to induction, all the
transfers to p` included in m1, m2, . . . ,mz (and possibly more transfers to p`) have
been processed by pj , thus plusz+1j (`) ≥ Σtrfk′ (`,w)∈{m1, m2,...,mz}w and, as pi processed
the messages in the order m1, m2, ...,mz,mz+1 (assumption), we have plusz+1i (`) =
Σtrfk′ (`,w)∈{m1, m2,...,mz}w. Hence, plus
z+1
j (`) ≥ plusz+1i (`).
On the side of the money transferred from p` as seen by pj . Let us observe that pj
has processed all the transfers from p` with a sequence number smaller than sn and
no transfer from p` with a sequence number greater than or equal to sn, thus we have
minusz+1j (`) = Σtrf`(k′,w)∈{m1, m2,...,mz}w = minusz+1i (`).
Let accountz+1i [`] be the value of accounti[`] just before pi processesmz+1, and accountz+1j [`]
be the value of accountj [`] at time τ . As accountz+1j [`] = init[`]+plusz+1j (`)−minusz+1j (`)
and accountz+1i [`] = init[`] + plusz+1i (`) − minusz+1i (`), it follows that accountj [`] is
greater than or equal to the value of accounti[`] just before pi processes mz+1, which was
itself greater than or equal to v (otherwise pi would not have processed mz+1 at that
time). It follows that accountj [`] ≥ v.
The two predicates of line 7 are therefore satisfied, and will remain so untilmz+1 is processed
(due to the FIFO order on transfers issued by p`), thus ensuring that process pj processes
the transfer mz+1. J
I Lemma 3. If a process pi issues a successful money transfer trfsni (k, v) (execution of
line 3) any correct process eventually processes the money transfer.
Proof. When process pi cr-broadcast money transfer trfsni (k, v), the local predicate (sn =
deli[i] + 1) ∧ (accounti[i] ≥ v) was true at pi. When pi cr-delivers its own transfer message,
the predicate is still true at line 7 and pi processes its transfer (if pi crashes after having
cr-broadcast the transfer and before processing it, we extend its execution—without loss
of correctness—by assuming it crashed just after processing the transfer). It follows from
Lemma 2 that any correct process processes trfsni (k, v). J
I Theorem 4. Algorithm 1 instantiated with CR-Broadcast implements a money transfer
object in the system model CAMPn,t [∅], and ensures that all operations by correct processes
terminate.
Proof. Lemma 1 proved that the invocations of the operations balance() and transfer() by
the correct processes terminate. Let us now consider MT-compliance.
Considering any execution of the algorithm, captured as history H = (L1, ..., Ln), let us
first consider a correct process pi. Let Si be the sequence of the following events happening
at pi (these events are “instantaneous” in the sense pi is not interrupted when it produces
each of them):
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the event blc(j)/v occurs when pi invokes balance(j) and obtains v (line 1), and
the event trfsnj (k, v) occurs when pi processes the corresponding transfer (lines 8-9 ex-
ecuted without interruption).
We show that Si is an MT-compliant serialization of Ai,T (H). When considering the con-
struction of Si, we have the following:
For all trfsnj (k, v) ∈ Lj we have that pj cr-broadcast this transfer and that (sn, transfer〈k, v〉)
was received by pj and was therefore successful: it follows from Lemma 3 that pi processes
this money transfer, and consequently we have trfsnj (k, v) ∈ Si.
For all op1 = trfsnj (k, v) and op2 = trfsn
′
j (k′, v′) in Si (two transfers issued by pj) such
that op1 →j op2, we have sn < sn′. Consequently pi processes op1 before op2, and we
have op1→Si op2.
For all pairs op1 and op2 belonging to Li, their serialization order is the same in Li and
Si.
It follows that Si is a serialization of Ai,T (H). Let us now show that Si is MT-compliant.
Case where the event in Si is trfsnj (k, v). In this case we have v ≤ acc(j, {op ∈ Si | op→Si
trfj(k, v)} because this condition is directly encoded at pi in the waiting predicate that
precedes the processing of op.
Case where the event in Si is blc(j)/v. In this case we have v = acc(j, {op ∈ Si | op→Si
blc(j)/v}, because this is exactly the way how the returned value v is computed in the
algorithm.
This terminates the proof for the correct processes.
For a process pi that crashes, the sequence of money transfers from a process pj that is
processed by pi is a prefix of the sequence of money transfers issued by pj (this follows from
the FIFO processing order, line 7). Hence, for each process pi that crashes there is a history
H ′ = (L′1, ..., L′n) where L′j is a prefix of Lj for each j 6= i and L′i = Li, such that, following
the same reasoning, the construction Si given above is an MT-compliant serialization of
Ai,T (H ′), which concludes the proof of the theorem. J
5.3 Money transfer vs atomic read/write register in the crash failure
model
It is shown in [5] that it is impossible to implement an atomic read/write register in the
distributed system model CAMPn,t [t∅], i.e., when, in addition to asynchrony, any number of
processes may crash. On the positive side, several algorithms implementing such a register
in CAMPn,t [t < n/2] have been proposed, each with its own features (see for example [4, 5,
20] to cite a few). As CAMPn,t [t < n/2] is a more constrained model than CAMPn,t [∅], it
follows that, from a CAMPn,t computability point of view, atomic read/write register is a
stronger problem than money transfer.
6 Instantiation and Proof in the Byzantine Failure Model
This section presents first the reliable broadcast abstraction whose operations instantiate the
r_broadcast() and r_deliver() operations used in the generic algorithm. Then, it proves that
the resulting algorithm correctly implements a money transfer object in BAMPn,t [t < n/3].
6.1 Reliable broadcast abstraction in the Byzantine failure model
The communication abstraction, denoted BR-Broadcast, was introduced in [7]. It is defined
by two operations denoted br_broadcast() and br_deliver() (hence we use the terminology
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“br-broadcast a message” and “br-deliver a message”). The difference between this commu-
nication abstraction and CR-Broadcast lies in the nature of failures. Namely, as a Byzantine
process can behave arbitrarily, CRB-Validity, CRB-Integrity, and CRB-Termination-2 can-
not be ensured. As an example, it is not possible to ensure that if a Byzantine process br-
delivers a message, all correct processes br-deliver it. BR-Broadcast is consequently defined
by the following properties. Termination-1 is the same in both communication abstractions,
while Integrity, Validity and Termination-2 consider only correct processes (the difference
lies in the added constraint written in italics).
BRB-Validity. If a correct process pi br-delivers a message from a correct process pj with
sequence number sn, then pj br-broadcast it with sequence number sn.
BRB-Integrity. For each sequence number sn and sender pj a correct process pi br-
delivers at most one message with sequence number sn from sender pj .
BRB-Termination-1. If a correct process br-broadcasts a message, it br-delivers it.
BRB-Termination-2. If a correct process br-delivers a message from a (correct or faulty)
process pj , then all correct processes br-deliver it.
It is shown in [8, 25] that t < n/3 is a necessary requirement to implement BR-Broadcast.
Several algorithms implementing this abstraction have been proposed. Among them, the
one presented in [7] is the most famous. It works in the model BAMPn,t [t < n/3], and
requires three consecutive communication steps. The one presented in [16] works in the
more constrained model BAMPn,t [t < n/5], but needs only two consecutive communication
steps. These algorithms show a trade-off between optimal t-resilience and time-efficiency.
6.2 Proof of Algorithm 1 in BAMPn,t [t < n/3]
The proof has the same structure, and is nearly the same, as the one for the process-crash
model presented in Section 5.2.
Notation
trfsnj (k, v) now denotes a money transfer (or the associated processing event by a process)
that correct processes br-deliver from pj with sequence number sn. If pj is a correct process,
this definition is the same as the one used in the model CAMPn,t [∅]. If pj is Byzantine,
transfer messages from pj do not necessarily correspond to actual transfer() invocations
by pj , but the BRB-Termination-2 property guarantees that all correct processes br-deliver
the same set of transfer messages (with the same sequence numbers), and therefore agree
on how pj ’s behavior should be interpreted. The reliable broadcast thus ensures a form of
weak agreement among correct processes in spite of Byzantine failures. This weak agreement
is what allows us to move almost seamlessly from a crash-failure model to a Byzantine model,
with no change to the algorithm, and only a limited adaptation of its proof.
More concretely, Lemma 2 (for crash failures) becomes the next lemma whose proof is the
same as for Lemma 2 in which the reference to the CBR-Termination-2 property is replaced
by a reference to its BRB counterpart.
I Lemma 5. If a correct process pi processes trfsnj (k, v), then any correct process processes
it.
I Lemma 6. If a correct process pi br-broadcasts a money transfer, all the correct processes
br-deliver and process it.
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Proof. When a correct process pi br-broadcasts a money transfer trfsni (k, v), we have (sn =
deli[i] + 1) ∧ (accounti[i] ≥ v), thus when it br-delivers it the predicate of line 7 is satisfied.
By Lemma 5, all the correct processes process this money transfer. J
I Theorem 7. Algorithm 1 instantiated with BR-Broadcast implements a money transfer
object in the system model BAMPn,t [t < n/3], and ensures that all operations by correct
processes terminate.
The model constraint t < n/3 is due only to the fact that Algorithm 1 uses BR-broadcast
(for which t < n/3 is both necessary and sufficient). As the invocations of balance() by
Byzantine processes may return arbitrary values and do not impact the correct processes,
they are not required to appear in their local histories.
Proof. The proof that the operations issued by the correct processes terminate is the same as
in Lemma 1 where the CRB-Termination properties are replaced by their BRB-Termination
counterparts.
To prove MT-compliance, let us first construct mock local histories for Byzantine pro-
cesses: the mock local history Lj associated with a Byzantine process pj is the sequence of
money transfers from pj that the correct processes br-deliver from pj and that they process.
(By Lemma 5 all correct processes process the same set of money transfers from pj).
Let pi be a correct process and Si be the sequence of operations occurring at pi defined
in the same way as in the crash failure model. In this construction, the following properties
are respected:
For all, trfsnj (k, v) ∈ Lj then
if pj is correct, it br-broadcast this money transfer and, due to Lemma 6, pi processes
it, hence trfsnj (k, v) ∈ Si.
if pj is Byzantine, due to the definition of Lj (sequence of money transfers that correct
processes br-delivers from pj and process), we have trfsnj (k, v) ∈ Si.
For all op1 = trfsnj (k, v) and op2 = trfsn
′
j (k′, v′) (two transfers in Lj ⊆ Si) such that
op1 →j op2, we have sn < sn′, consequently pi processes op1 before op2, and we have
op1→Si op2.
For all both op1 and op2 belonging to Li, their serialization order is the same in Li as
in Si (same as for the crash case).
It follows that Si is a serialization of Ai,T (H˜) where H˜ = (L1, .., Ln), Li being the sequence
of its operations if pi is correct, and a mock sequence of money transfers, if it is Byzantine.
The same arguments that were used in the crash failure model can be used here to prove
that Si is MT-compliant. Since all correct processes observe the same mock sequence of
operations Lj for any given Byzantine process pj , it follows that the algorithm implements
an MT-compliant money transfer object in BAMPn,t [t < n/3]. J
6.3 Extending to incomplete Byzantine Networks
An algorithm is described in [26] which simulates a fully connected (point-to-point) network
on top of an asynchronous Byzantine message-passing system in which, while the underlying
communication network is incomplete (not all the pairs of processes are connected by a
channel), it is (2t+ 1)-connected (i.e., any pair of processes is connected by (2t+ 1) disjoint
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paths8). Moreover, it is shown that this connectivity requirement is both necessary and
sufficient.9
Hence, denoting BAMPn,t [t < n/3, (2t + 1)-connected] such a system model, this al-
gorithm builds BAMPn,t [t < n/3] on top BAMPn,t [t < n/3, (2t+1)-connected] (both models
have the same computability power). It follows that the previous money-transfer algorithm
works in incomplete (2t+ 1)-connected asynchronous Byzantine systems where t < n/3.
7 Conclusion
The article has revisited the synchronization side of the money-transfer problem in failure-
prone asynchronous message-passing systems. It has presented a generic algorithm that
solves money transfer in asynchronous message-passing systems where processes may exper-
ience failures. This algorithm uses an underlying reliable broadcast communication abstrac-
tion, which differs according to the type of failures (process crashes or Byzantine behaviors)
that processes can experience.
In addition to its genericity (hence modular) dimension, the proposed algorithm is sur-
prisingly simple10 and particularly efficient (in addition to money-transfer data, each mes-
sage generated by the algorithm only carries one sequence number). As a side effect, this
algorithm has shown that, in the crash failure model, money transfer is a weaker problem
than the construction of a read/write register. As far as the Byzantine failure model is
concerned, we conjecture that t < n/3 is a necessary requirement for money transfer (as it
is for the construction of a read/write register [15]).
For the interested reader, a slightly weaker version of money transfer (which can be built
from a message ordering weaker than FIFO) is presented in an Appendix. Finally, it is worth
noticing that this article adds one more member to the family of algorithms that strive to
“unify” the crash failure model and the Byzantine failure model as studied in [6, 11, 17, 22].
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A Replacing FIFO by a weaker ordering requirement in CAMPn,t [∅]
An interesting question is the following one: is the FIFO order necessary to implement
money transfer in the model CAMPn,t [∅]? While we conjecture it is, it appears that, a
small change in the specification of money transfer allows us to use a weakened FIFO order,
as shown below.
Weakened money transfer specification
The change in the specification presented in Section 3 concerns the definition of the seri-
alisation Si associated with each process pi. In this modified version the serialization Si
associated with each process pi is no longer required to respect the process order on the
operations issued by pj , j 6= i. This means that two different process pi and pk may observe
the transfer() operations issued by a process pj in different orders (which captures the fact
that some transfer operations by a process pj are commutative with respect to its current
account).
Modification of the algorithm
Let k be a constant integer ≥ 1. Let sni(j) be the highest sequence number such that all
the transfer messages from pj whose sequence numbers belong to {1, · · · , .sni(j)} have been
cr-delivered and processed by a certain process pi (i.e., lines 8-9 have been executed for these
messages). Initially we have sni(j) = 0.
Let sn be the sequence number of a message cr-delivered by pi from pj . At line 7 the
predicate sn = deli[j] + 1 can be replaced by the predicate sn ∈ {sni(j) + 1, · · · , sni(j) +k}.
Let us notice that this predicate boils down to sn = deli[j] + 1 when k = 1. More generally
the set of sequence numbers {sni(j)+1, · · · , sni(j)+k} defines a sliding window for sequence
numbers which allows the corresponding messages to be processed.
The important point here is the fact that messages can be processed in an order that
does not respect their sending order as long as all the messages are processed, which is not
guaranteed when k = +∞. Assuming pj issues an infinite number of transfers, if k = +∞
it is possible that, while all these messages are cr-delivered by pi, some of them are never
processed at lines 8-9 (their processing being always delayed by other messages that arrived
after them). The finiteness of the value k prevents this unfair message processing order from
occurring.
The proof of Section 5.2 must be appropriately adapted to show that this modification
implements the weakened money transfer specification.
